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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Law Professors teach at the two law schools in the State of Utah, the University
of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark
Law School. Each law professor’s institutional affiliation is provided for identification
purposes only and represents her or his individual opinion. As educators who have
dedicated their careers to preparing students in Utah to enter the legal profession, the
Law Professors have a unique interest in bar admission in the state.1
Individual professors who form part of the amicus Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah
Law Professors submitting this brief include:
• Robert W. Adler, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Curtis Anderson, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Jensie L. Anderson, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Kif Augustine-Adams, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark
Law School
• Shima Baradaran Baughman, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law
• Benjamin Cook, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School

In preparing this brief, amicus relied on briefs submitted as part of litigation on
substantially the same issue in California and New York, as well as materials provided by
the Utah State Bar and Kristen Olsen. We express gratitude for that assistance.
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• Elysa Dishman, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Randy L. Dryer, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• Robert L. Flores, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Leslie Francis, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Frederick Mark Gedicks, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• Erika George, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Carl Hernandez III, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• Christine Hurt, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Cathy Hwang, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Matthew Jennejohn, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• Robert B. Keiter, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Young Ran (Christine) Kim, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law
• Robin Kundis Craig, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Kristin Gerdy Kyle, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
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• D. Carolina Núñez, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law
School
• John Ruple, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Alexander Skibine, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Gladriel Shobe, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• D. Gordon Smith, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Linda F. Smith, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
• Paul Stancil, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Michalyn Steele, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
• Lisa Grow Sun, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School
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INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, now codified in relevant part at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. Sections 1621(a) and (d) of Title 8 make certain aliens ineligible
“for any State or local public benefit,” in the absence “of a State law [that] affirmatively
provides for such eligibility.” These provisions do not prohibit the admission of otherwise
eligible undocumented immigrants to the practice of law in Utah, and this Court should
enter an order allowing all undocumented immigrants to apply for admission to the practice
of law in Utah.
First, a license to practice law in Utah is not a “State or local public benefit” as
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1) because it is not “provided by an agency of a State or local
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.” 8 U.S.C. §
1621(c)(1)(A). The Utah Supreme Court, which issues licenses to practice law in Utah, is
not “an agency of a State or local government” but an independent branch of state
government granted plenary power under the Utah Constitution to administer and regulate
admission to the Utah Bar. Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. Neither is the Utah State Bar, the
entity to which the Utah Supreme Court has delegated the administrative tasks of bar
admission, “an agency of a State or local government.” Rather, the Utah State Bar is
incorporated as a private non-profit entity and receives no public funds. See Exhibit A,
Certificate of Existence: Utah State Bar, Utah Department of Commerce and Exhibit B,
Declaration of John C. Baldwin, Executive Director of the Utah Bar. Moreover, in Utah,
admission to the Bar is not provided through “appropriated funds of a State or local
4

government” but through fees charged directly to applicants and members of the Bar. Only
private funds finance law licensing in Utah. Because the Utah Supreme Court is not “an
agency of a State or local government” and law licensing in Utah is financed by private
funds rather than by “appropriated funds of a State or local government,” section 1621 does
not apply to bar admission in Utah.
Second, even if this Court decides that a license to practice law in Utah is a “State
or local public benefit” under section 1621(c), this Court may nonetheless authorize the
Utah State Bar to admit otherwise eligible undocumented immigrants to practice law in
Utah. Section 1621(d) of Title 8 allows a state to provide a “State or local public benefit”
for which an alien would otherwise be ineligible under section 1621(a) through an
“enactment of a State law . . . which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1621(d). Because the Utah Constitution provides the Utah Supreme Court the exclusive
power to regulate law licensing in Utah, Utah Const. art. VIII, this Court is the only entity
able to opt-out of section 1621(c)’s prohibitions with respect to law licensing in Utah.
Therefore, section 1621(d) should not be read to require a legislative-enactment opt-out.
Principles of constitutional avoidance, federalism, and the Tenth Amendment exact respect
for Utah’s structure of its sovereign powers. Congress cannot commandeer state
sovereignty to its own ends. Through its state constitution, Utah has chosen to give
authority over bar admission to its courts, without requiring additional action by its
legislature. Accordingly, the power to override the prohibitions in section 1621(c) with
respect to law licensing in Utah may be exercised by this Court, a power the state legislature

5

cannot usurp. Congress has no power to decree otherwise, and section 1621(d) should not
be read to do so.
Finally, the Court should enter an order that allows all undocumented immigrants,
rather than the narrow class of undocumented immigrants specified in the Petitioners’
proposed order, to apply for admission to the practice of law in Utah. Such a rule would
conserve judicial resources by avoiding this Court’s separate consideration of every
possible variation on immigration status that might make an individual ineligible for receipt
of a “State or local public benefit” under section 1621. In addition, a broad order and rule
would be consistent with the underlying purposes of section 1621.
ARGUMENT
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, now codified in relevant part at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (“PRWORA”). Section 1621(a) of Title 8 provides that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” certain categories of aliens, including the
class of aliens often referred to as “undocumented immigrants,” 2 are “not eligible for any
State or local public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), however, “a
State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible
for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible

8 U.S.C. § 1621 excludes any alien who is not “a qualified alien,” “a nonimmigrant,” or
“an alien who is paroled into the United States . . . for less than one year” and references
other parts of the U.S. Code for definitions of those terms. Here, we use the term
“undocumented immigrant” to refer generally to any noncitizen who does not meet the
definitions of “qualified alien,” “nonimmigrant,” or “alien who is paroled into the United
States.”

2
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under subsection (a) only through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996,
which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
These provisions do not prohibit the admission of undocumented immigrants to the
practice of law in Utah. First, a license to practice law is not a “State or local public benefit”
as defined in section 1621(c). Second, even if a license to practice law is a “State or local
public benefit,” this Court may nonetheless authorize admission of undocumented
immigrants under the provisions of section 1621(d).
I.

8 U.S.C. § 1621(C) DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE ADMISSION OF
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS TO PRACTICE LAW IN UTAH
BECAUSE A LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW IN UTAH IS NOT A
“STATE OR LOCAL PUBLIC BENEFIT.”
Though 8 U.S.C. § 1621 makes certain aliens ineligible for a “State or local public

benefit,” the statute’s own definition of that term squarely excludes a license to practice
law in Utah. Section 1621(c) defines “State or local public benefit” in relevant part as “any
grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of
a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.” 8
U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A). A license to practice law in Utah is not “provided by an agency of
a State.” Neither is a license to practice law in Utah provided “by appropriated funds of a
State or local government.” As a result, a Utah law license is not a “State or local public
benefit” for which undocumented immigrants are ineligible under federal law.
A.

A Utah Law License Is Not Provided by an Agency of a State
or Local Government.

Section 1621(c) defines a “State or local public benefit” to include professional
licenses that are “provided by an agency of a State or local government.” 8 U.S.C. §
7

1621(c)(1)(A). The Utah Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the regulatory power
over the legal profession in Utah—including the authority to admit persons to practice
law—in this Court. Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. See also, Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah,
2016 UT 21, ¶ 14, 374 P.3d 14, 18. This Court, in turn, has delegated the functions of
administering the bar examination and certifying applicants for licensure to the Utah State
Bar, through its Board of Bar Commissioners. See Utah Supreme Court Rules Governing
the Utah State Bar, Rule 14-104(a) (“The Board, by delegation from the Supreme Court,
shall have the power to determine the qualifications and requirements for admission to the
practice of law and to conduct examinations of applicants; and it shall from time to time
certify to the Court those applicants found to be qualified.”). Neither the Utah Supreme
Court nor the Utah State Bar is “an agency of a State or local government.”
1.

The Utah Supreme Court Is a Co-Equal Branch of State
Government, Not an Agency.

The Utah Supreme Court is the third and co-equal branch of the Utah state
government. As such, it is not an “agency.” This is consistent with federal law and state
law interpretations of the term “agency.”
Section 1621 provides no definition of the term “agency” and that provision’s
legislative history provides no insight into its definition. Neither does 8 U.S.C. § 1611, the
comparable statute prohibiting an “agency of the United States” from providing “federal
public benefits” to undocumented immigrants, include a definition of “agency.” However,
“agency” is defined elsewhere in federal law to expressly exclude the courts. For example,
the Administrative Procedure Act—the foundational statute for federal government
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regulation—defines the term “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include . . . the courts of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551 (emphasis added). Likewise,
the Federal False Statements Statute excludes courts from its definition of agency. See
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 6 which defines
“agency” as “any department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United
States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to
be used in a more limited sense”). The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise interpreted the
term “agency” to exclude courts: “In ordinary parlance, federal courts are not described as
‘departments’ or ‘agencies’ of the Government . . . . [I]t would be strange indeed to refer
to a court as an ‘agency.’” Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 699.
Utah state law also specifically excludes courts from the definition of “agency.”
Utah’s Administrative Procedures Act makes the point: “‘Agency’ . . . does not mean . . .
the courts . . . .” Utah Code § 63G-4-103 (1)(b). See also, Utah Code § 63I-1-102(1) (not
including courts in the definition of “agency” subject to legislative oversight and periodic
review); Utah Code § 63J-1-102(1) (not including courts in the definition of “agency”
under the Budgetary Procedures Act).
Absent any context that might suggest otherwise, the term “agency” in section 1621
must be interpreted consistently with how it is used in other statutes. Here, the most closely
analogous federal and state laws support the conclusion that the term “agency” does not
include the courts.
9

2.

The Utah State Bar Is Not “An Agency of a State or Local
Government.”

The Utah State Bar, to which the Utah Supreme Court has delegated the functions
of administering the bar examination and certifying applicants for licensure to the Utah
State Bar, is likewise not “an agency of a State or local government.” Rather, the Utah
State Bar is incorporated in Utah as a domestic non-profit entity. See Exhibit A, Certificate
of Existence: Utah State Bar, Utah Department of Commerce and Exhibit B, Declaration
of John C. Baldwin, Executive Director of the Utah Bar. Thus, even on the counter-factual
argument that the Utah State Bar is the attorney licensing entity in Utah rather than this
Court, section 1621 would not prohibit it from admitting undocumented immigrants to the
bar.
B.

A Utah Law License Is Not Provided by “Appropriated Funds
of a State or Local Government.”

In addition to defining a “State or local public benefit” to include a professional
license “provided by an agency of the State,” section 1621 also defines “State or local
public benefit” to include a professional license “provided by appropriated funds of a State
or local government.” In Utah, the issuance of law licenses is not funded by “appropriated
funds” under accepted interpretations of that term.
As with the term “agency,” PRWORA does not define the phrase “appropriated
funds of a State.” Other law and sources are, therefore, helpful in determining its meaning.
See Marcus v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Compensation Progs., U.S. Dept. of Labor, 548
F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The term “appropriated” means “to set apart for or
assign to a particular purpose or use.” Appropriate, Merriam Webster Online Dictionary,
10

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/appropriate#h2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2019); see

also Black’s Law Dictionary 117–18 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “appropriation” as “[a]
legislative body’s act of setting aside a sum of money for a public purpose”). This ordinary
meaning of the term has been adopted by both federal and Utah state courts. See Wilcox v.
Jackson ex dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. 498, 509 (1839) (“Appropriation . . . is nothing more
or less than setting it apart for some particular use.”); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d
1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1985). Accord State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 948 (Utah 1992);
Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 223 n.2, 235, 322 P.2d 381 (Utah 1958).
The question here is whether the Utah legislature has “set apart” funds for the Utah
Supreme Court for a “particular use” prohibited by section 1621. The answer is no. Neither
the Utah State Bar nor the Utah Supreme Court use funds “set apart” by the Utah legislature
for the licensing of attorneys. Rather, as described more fully below, the licensing of
attorneys in Utah is funded by private licensing fees and Utah State Bar membership dues.
While the Utah Supreme Court is an entity funded by Utah legislative appropriations, the
Court’s role in attorney licensing—entry of the final order for admission to the practice of
law—cannot itself fairly be described as being funded by “appropriated” money. No
governmental entity sets aside funds for that specific purpose.
1.

Attorney Licensing in Utah Is Funded Solely Through Private
Money.

As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court has delegated the functions of attorney
licensing in Utah to the Utah State Bar through its Board of Bar Commissioners. Utah
Supreme Court Rules Governing the Utah State Bar, Rule 14-104(a). These licensing
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functions are not funded by any appropriated funds of a state or local government. Rather,
they are funded solely by licensing fees paid by the applicants themselves and bar
membership dues paid by Utah attorneys. See Exhibit B, Declaration of John C. Baldwin,
¶ 5. Utah Supreme Court Rules specifically provide for applicants to pay fees to facilitate
the tasks associated with admission to the bar and for members to “pay to the Bar a license
fee . . . to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.” Utah Supreme Court Rules Governing
the Utah State Bar, Rules 14-104(c), 14-107. Even when the Utah Supreme Court clerk
issues the final certificate of admission to a successful bar applicant, Utah rules require the
applicant to pay a fee for the certificate. Utah Supreme Court Rules Governing the Utah
State Bar, Rule 14-104(d). Private licensing fees and member dues are the sole source of
funding for attorney licensing in Utah. See Exhibit B, Declaration of John C. Baldwin, ¶
5.
This Court should not be persuaded by the New York Supreme Court’s finding in
Matter of Vargas that law licensing is accomplished through “appropriated funds,” because
the financial structure of law licensing in Utah is substantially different than that in New
York. See Matter of Application of Cesar Adrian Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 590 (2015)
(outlining specific ways the use of New York State’s annual judiciary budget supports law
licensing activities including, especially, the time-intensive evaluation of character and
fitness by judges). The relevant tasks of bar admission in Utah—expenses of administering
the bar examination, character and fitness evaluation, costs associated with the swearingin ceremony, salaries of Utah State Bar admissions counsel and staff, etc. —are privately

12

funded. Exhibit B, Declaration of John C. Baldwin, ¶¶ 6-12. The Utah legislature does not
appropriate funds to pay for law licensing.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court’s Order of Admission Does Not
Change the Private Financial Structure of Law Licensing in
Utah.

After the Utah State Bar’s Board of Bar Commissioners has certified applicants for
licensure, the Utah Supreme Court makes the final order of approval for admission to the
bar. Utah Supreme Court Rules Governing the Utah State Bar, Rule 14-104(c). While the
Utah Supreme Court is an entity funded by Utah legislative appropriations, the Court’s role
in attorney licensing—entry of the final order for admission to the practice of law—cannot
itself fairly be described as being funded by “appropriated” money. No governmental entity
sets aside funds for that specific purpose. This Court’s final act of approval does not
transform the private financial structure of law licensing in Utah into one of appropriated
funds.
Courts in California, Nevada, and Ohio have held that government actions much
more involved than a final bar admission order—enforcement of child support payments,
payment of prevailing wage rates under a public contract, and administration of a worker’s
compensation fund—do not transform private funds into public funds or benefits. See Cty.
of Alameda v. Agustin, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 7665, *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24,
2007) (deciding that “child support collection services” provided by the state to enforce
payment of private child support orders are not a public benefit under section 1621); 3

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 30(f) allows citation of unpublished opinions
“so long as all parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time all such
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Campos v. Anderson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that state and
local governments’ active assistance in collecting child support payments does not change
the fact that the source of the payments are private); City Plan Dev. Inc. v. Office of Labor
Comm’r 117 P.3d 182, 190 (Nev. 2005) (finding that the payment of prevailing wage rates
by a contractor to workers under a public contract is not a “local public benefit” for
purposes of section 1621); Rajeh v. Steel City Corp., 813 N.E.2d 697, 707 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (reasoning that workers’ compensation is distinguishable from many of the benefits
listed in section 1621 because it was intended to serve as a tort remedy and is funded by
employers rather than the government, even though the state government administers the
funds).
Likewise, when allowing noncitizens access to certain benefits, courts in New York
and New Jersey have emphasized that PRWORA prohibits public benefits, i.e., those
provided through public moneys, not privately funded endeavors. See, e.g., Trs. of the
Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare, Pension, Annuity & Apprenticeship Skill
Improv. & Safety Funds v. M.C. Landscape Group, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177271,
*25 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (recognizing the exclusion of ERISA from federal public benefits
under 8 U.S.C. § 1611 because ERISA is privately funded and administered); Herrera v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145409, *26–*30 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (excluding
the “proceeds of federal group life insurance obtained by federal employees” from federal
public benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1611 such that a beneficiary’s undocumented status did

decisions are first cited.” An accurate copy is attached as Exhibit C, County of Alameda
v. Agustin, 2007 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 7665.
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not make him illegible to receive the proceeds after his spouse’s death); Caballero v.
Martinez, 897 A.2d 1026, 1031 n.1 (N.J. 2006) (finding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a) & (c) did
not apply to exclude an undocumented person from recovery under New Jersey’s
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgement Fund because the fund was administered by a “private,
non-profit entity,” funded “by fees levied on liability insurance companies doing business”
in the state, and, unlike other listed public benefits, eligibility was compensatory rather
than needs-based).
If this Court nonetheless believes to the contrary—that the final order of this Court
approving certified applicants to the bar transforms the entire privately funded licensing
endeavor into one of “appropriated funds”—amicus suggest a simple solution: this
Court implement, under its Rules Governing the Utah State Bar, a reasonable fee
charged to all applicants specifically identified as funding the Supreme Court’s final
order process. The fee could be similar to the one charged to successful applicants for
the certificate the Supreme Court clerk issues under Utah Supreme Court Rules
Governing the Utah State Bar, Rule 14-104(d). A final order process fee would be in line
with the private fee financial structure of law licensing in Utah and would remove the
slightest doubt that a Utah bar license is not “provided by appropriated funds of a State
or local government.”
In sum, a Utah law license is not “provided by an agency or a State or local government
or by appropriated funds of a State or local government” and is therefore not a “State or
local public benefit.” Section 1621, therefore, does not apply to preclude this Court from
issuing a law license in Utah to undocumented immigrants.
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II.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO OPT OUT OF
SECTION 1621(C) PROHIBITIONS FOR LAW LICENSING IN UTAH
UNDER SECTION 1621(D).
Even if this Court decides that a license to practice law in Utah is a “State or local

public benefit” under section 1621(c), the Utah Supreme Court may nonetheless authorize
admission of undocumented immigrants under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). Under
section 1621(d), a state may grant a “State or local public benefit” to aliens who would
otherwise be ineligible “only through the enactment of a State law” after 1996. On first
blush, this language may appear to empower only state legislatures, rather than other
branches of the state government, to override the ineligibility provision. A closer look at
the Utah Constitution and federal constitutional principles, however, weighs against such
an interpretation.
The Utah Constitution vests the power to regulate admission to the practice of law
in Utah exclusively in the Utah Supreme Court. This Court, then, is the only entity that
may exercise the authority granted in section 1621(d), and this Court may do so to extend
eligibility for admission to practice law in Utah to undocumented immigrants. Utah’s
choice to give authority over bar admission to this Court, without requiring additional
action by its legislature, is one that is entitled to respect under the Tenth Amendment’s
state sovereignty protections. Interpreting section 1621(d) to require an act of the Utah
legislature would render the state of Utah unable to avail itself of this federally-provided,
opt-out provision without the Utah legislature impermissibly encroaching on this Court’s
constitutionally-conferred power.
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A.

The State of Utah Has Exercised Its Sovereignty to Entrust
Governance of Lawyers and Law Licensing Exclusively to the
Utah Supreme Court.

As a factual matter, Utah allocates its sovereign power to govern the practice of law
differently than do the three other states that have opted out of section 1621’s prohibition
with respect to law licensing: California, Florida, and New York. In California and Florida,
the judiciary and the legislature share the power to govern the practice of law. In re Garcia,
315 P.3d 117, 124 (Cal. 2014); Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d 432, 439 (Fla. 2014).
Thus, no ultra vires action occurred when each respective state legislature enacted a law to
opt out of section 1621’s prohibitions on law licensing for certain noncitizens. In New York
State, the judiciary governs the practice of law but as a matter of ordinary legislation. See
Matter of Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 582. The New York Supreme Court itself exercised that
governance power to opt out of section 1621’s prohibition on admission of certain
noncitizens to the bar. Id. The New York Supreme Court rejected a literal reading of section
1621(d) to require a legislative-enactment opt out, holding instead that “the processes by
which a state chooses to exercise, by one of its coequal branches of government, the
authority granted by the federal legislation is not a legitimate concern of the federal
government.” Id. at 594.
Like New York State, Utah entrusts governance of lawyers and law licensing
exclusively to the judiciary, but does so constitutionally rather than through ordinary
legislation. Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. The question of federal congressional interference
with state sovereignty is thus even more significant in Utah than it was in New York. Prior
to 1985, Utah’s Constitution allocated regulation of lawyers and law practice jointly to the
17

state legislature and the Utah Supreme Court, much like California and Florida currently
do. See Injured Workers, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 19. In 1984, Utah made a considered judgment
that, as a matter of constitutional structure, the Utah Supreme Court alone should exercise
the sovereign authority to govern the practice of law. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25. Utah Supreme Court
case law consistently reaffirms that exclusivity. See id. at ¶ 19; In re Discipline of Harding,
2004 UT 100, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1220 (“[A]ttorney discipline proceedings, being the exclusive
province of this court, are conducted under the rules and directions we give.”); In re
Schwenke, 2004 UT 17, ¶ 35, 89 P.3d 117 (“[W]e take this opportunity to emphasize that
the Utah Constitution is clear in its pronouncement that this court controls the practice of
law. Under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, we have the exclusive
constitutional mandate to do so.”) (emphasis added); Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 2000
UT 96, ¶ 9, 16 P.3d 1230 (“The Utah Constitution grants exclusive power to this court to
‘govern the practice of law . . . .’”); Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, Pub.
Adjusters, 905 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Utah 1995) (“This Court has the exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law in Utah.”); Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335, 336-37 (Utah
1997) (“The Utah Constitution vests sole authority for regulating the practice of law in this
court.”); Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1992) (“[O]nly this court has the
rule-making power over the practice of law and the procedures of the Bar.”).
While “there may be exceptions to the separation-of-powers doctrine” and thus to
this Court’s exclusive power to govern the practice of law and bar admissions, “any
exception must be found within the Utah Constitution.” Injured Workers, 2016 UT 21, ¶
13 (citing State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d 476). No such exception exists. The
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Utah legislature could not act directly to opt-out of section 1621’s prohibitions nor could
this Court delegate such authority to it. Id. at ¶ 43. If the Utah legislature were to “enact a
State law” that section 1621(d) purports to require, that enactment would violate the Utah
Constitution and overstep the legislature’s authority.
B.

The Tenth Amendment and Principles of Federalism Protect
Utah’s Constitutional Structure and Allow This Court to OptOut of Section 1621 Prohibitions if Those Prohibitions Apply
to Law Licensing in Utah.

Interpreting section 1621(d) to require an act of the Utah legislature would render
Utah unable to exercise the federally-provided right to opt out of section 1621(a) without
the Utah legislature engaging in an unconstitutional act or Utah amending its Constitution.
This outcome not only is absurd but also raises serious questions of federalism and divided
sovereignty that this Court can avoid by interpreting section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision to
be satisfied by a ruling and order from this Court.
First, an interpretation that excludes Utah from section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision
impermissibly discriminates against Utah. The U.S. Congress cannot discriminate against
one state by excluding it from a right or benefit it purports to provide to all states based on
an individual state’s constitutional structure and exercise of sovereignty. Neither can the
U.S. Congress require a state to restructure its government in order to avail itself of a right
or benefit provided to other states whose governmental structures differ. This, too, amounts
to an impermissible distinction among states. Utah, by virtue of its admission into the
Union, must be on equal footing with the other states of the Union and therefore must be
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able to exercise the opt-out provision in section 1621 without an amendment to its state
constitution.
Second, requiring Utah to restructure its government to allow Utah to exercise
section 1621’s opt-out provision is an impermissible commandeering of state power. The
federal government has broad authority over immigration, but that power does not include
the power to dictate a state’s constitutional structure. This is especially true here, where the
federal government has not made a policy decision about whether undocumented
immigrants should be eligible for a “State or local benefit.” To the contrary, the U.S.
Congress has expressly left that decision to each state. Interpreting section 1621 as
requiring Utah to make a constitutional amendment in order to exercise a decision left
expressly to each state runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s Tenth Amendment.
1.

Congress Must Give Utah Equal Access to Section 1621(d)’s
Opt-Out Provision.

If Utah’s constitutional structure prevents the state from exercising section
1621(d)’s opt-out provision, section 1621 violates well-established principles of federalism
and divided sovereignty. All states are admitted to, and continue as a part of, the Union on
an equal footing. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911) (“[T]here is to be found no
sanction for the contention that any State may be deprived of any of the power
constitutionally possessed by other States, as States, by reason of the terms in which the
acts admitting them to the Union have been framed.”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713–14 (1999). The equal footing requirement means that Utah may structure its
sovereign powers as it chooses and Congress cannot exclude Utah, because of its
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constitutional structure, from options available to states that structure their sovereign
powers differently. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713–14. The Tenth Amendment “expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
impairs the states’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). In doing so, the amendment recognizes the
well-settled principle that “the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty
intact.” Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). California and
Florida exercised a legislative opt-out of section 1621’s prohibitions with respect to bar
admissions. Utah’s legislature, however, cannot enact a law regulating admission to the
practice of law because Utah’s constitution vests that power exclusively in this Court. The
absurd result of interpreting section 1621 to require a state legislature’s act, then, is that
Utah would be unable to exercise a federally-provided option that is available to states with
other kinds of government structures.
While an amendment to Utah’s constitution would cure Utah’s ineligibility to
exercise the opt-out provision, requiring a constitutional amendment in order for Utah to
exercise its federally-provided option would likewise be impermissible for the same
reasons. The U.S. Congress cannot require of Utah something it does not require of other
states, especially when it comes to basic matters of state sovereignty, in order for a state to
exercise section 1621’s opt-out provision. Indeed, the U.S. Congress cannot dictate state
constitutional structures after a state has been admitted to the Union. See, e.g., Coyle, 221
U.S. at 569 (“No fundamental principles could be added by way of amendment, as this
would have been making part of the state constitution.”) (citation omitted).
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This disparate access to section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision would be an
impermissible violation of Utah’s protected equal footing among the states. This Court may
avoid this result by interpreting section 1621(d) to allow a judicial opt-out where a state’s
constitution requires a judicial opt-out. A judicial opt-out would not question “the primacy
of federal law” but only serve to implement “the law in a manner consistent with the
constitutional sovereignty of the States.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 732.
2.

Congress Cannot Commandeer State Powers to Its Own Ends.

In addition to violating Utah’s guaranteed equal footing with other states, requiring
a constitutional amendment to (or a violation of) Utah’s constitution, in order to exercise
section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision, is an impermissible commandeering of state powers.
The federal government admittedly has broad power over immigration that binds
the states. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976). Here, however, the federal
government has not exercised that power to implement a particular immigration-related
policy. To the contrary, the U.S. Congress has expressly given states the power to decide
whether they will provide any particular “State or local benefit” to undocumented
immigrants. The U.S. Congress can more accurately be described as providing a particular
process for making that decision. Section 1621(d), then, represents not a federal judgment
on whether benefits should be extended to noncitizens, but rather a federal judgment on
which branch of state government should decide whether to extend those benefits. This,
however, is not a legitimate concern of the federal government because Congress’s power
does not extend to an individual state’s constitutional structure.
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A legislative-enactment requirement, if section 1621(d) were read to impose one,
would be unconstitutional because principles of state sovereignty recognized by the Tenth
Amendment protect the integrity and independence of state governments against undue
interference from the federal government. “[T]he Constitution has never been understood
to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’
instructions.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992); see also Coyle, 221
U.S. at 565. But that is precisely what a legislative-enactment requirement would do.
The sovereignty recognized by the Tenth Amendment bars both direct and indirect
forms of interference by the federal government. Congress may not direct a state to enact
a specific law or implement a specific policy. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), affirmed that “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”
Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot “commandeer” state executive branch officials); Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Assoc., 584 U.S. __ (2018) (holding that Congress cannot “commandeer” the state
legislative process).
Nor may Congress offer the states incentives to adopt federal policies that are so
powerful that they amount to coercion, because such incentives would compromise the
integrity and independence of state decision-making processes. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578–79 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (The Court “scrutinize[s] the
Spending Clause legislation to ensure that Congress is not using financial inducements to
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exert a ‘power akin to undue influence.’” (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 590 (1937)). While Congress can offer states the choice of regulating according to
federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation, it cannot unduly
coerce the states into making that choice in a way that effectively undermines the
independence of state decision-making processes. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174–78
(finding Congress violated state sovereignty by coercing the states into adopting
Congress’s preferred regulatory scheme or taking title to nuclear waste).
Similarly, the federal government cannot interfere with the processes of state
government by specifying which state officials or which branch of state government may
exercise the power of the state sovereign. Since “a State can only perform its functions
through its officers, a restraint upon them is a restraint upon its sovereignty. . . .” Alden,
527 U.S. at 747 (quoting General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226 (1908)). Thus, in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the court interpreted a federal statute in a way
that was contrary to its “plain language” to avoid interfering with structures of state
government decision-making. Id. at 465–66. The Court declined to apply the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to Missouri’s state constitutional requirement that its
supreme-court judges retire at the age of seventy, even though the “plain language” of the
federal statute made it applicable to all persons appointed “at the policymaking level.” Id.
at 465–66. The Court found it “essential to the independence of the States . . . that their
power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers” should be “exclusive, and free
from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the
United States.” Id. at 460 (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71 (1900)).
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While Gregory dealt with the state’s interest in determining who holds office, the state has
a similarly essential interest in determining which of its officials or subdivisions is
empowered to make a given decision, particularly where the state makes that choice in its
constitution.
The federal government’s broad power over immigration does not make it
appropriate for federal law to displace the states’ traditional authority over their own
governmental processes. The Supreme Court made this clear in the context of equalprotection doctrine, where strict scrutiny generally applies to state laws affecting aliens, by
making an exception for state rules on who can hold important state governmental office
or serve in other positions performing functions that are important to state sovereignty. See,
e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). These “sovereign-function” cases exempt
from strict scrutiny a state’s decisions about eligibility for such positions, because the
decisions that officials in those positions make are “intimately related to the process of
democratic self-government.” Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984). Similarly, here,
the fact that the state governmental decision at issue involves immigrants does not
empower the federal government to take away from the states their decisions about which
state governmental entity should exercise the power of the sovereign—in Utah’s case, the
Supreme Court.
III.

ANY RULE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT PROMULGATES SHOULD
ALLOW ADMISSION OF APPLICANTS TO THE BAR IRRESPECTIVE
OF THEIR IMMIGRATION STATUS.
While amicus argue that sections 1621(a) and (c) do not prohibit admission of

undocumented immigrants to the Utah bar, if this Court decides otherwise and exercises
25

its power to opt out under section 1621(d), it should do so through an order broader than
the one Petitioners propose. This Court should enter an order authorizing the admission of
otherwise eligible undocumented immigrants to the practice of law in Utah. Such an order
would conserve judicial resources in a manner consistent with the purposes underlying
section 1621.
Petitioners’ proposed order largely tracks the language for Deferred Action
Childhood Arrival (“DACA”) eligibility and would, if entered by this Court, make eligible
for bar admission only a very narrow category of noncitizens. State classifications based
on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny because “aliens as a class ‘are a prime example of
a “discrete and insular” minority.’” Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642 (internal citations omitted).
Rather than distinguishing among classes of noncitizens eligible for admission to the Utah
Bar, this Court’s order and rule making should allow individuals to apply for admission to
the Utah Bar irrespective of their immigration status. A narrower order is likely to result in
this Court’s future consideration of various classes of noncitizens that might be considered
ineligible for a “State or local public benefit” under section 1621. The complexity and
constantly-changing nature of immigration law results in an unpredictable and everchanging spectrum of immigration status that is best addressed by a broader order.
The very text and structure of section 1621 evidences the difficulty of distinguishing
between different categories of noncitizens. Section 1621(a) excludes a noncitizen from
eligibility for a “State or local public benefit” if he or she is not a “qualified alien,” a
“nonimmigrant,” or “an alien who is paroled into the United States . . . for less than one
year.” Section 1621(a) refers to other provisions to define these categories of aliens who
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are eligible for the benefits. The opt-out provision of section 1621(d), however, refers to
“illegal aliens” in the subheading and to an “alien who is not lawfully present in the United
States.” Neither “illegal aliens” nor “alien who is not lawfully present in the United States”
are defined in section 1621, and section 1621 includes no reference to outside provisions
that might shed light on the legal meaning of those provisions. A broad order that captures
any immigrant made ineligible for benefits under section 1621(a) would avoid the need for
this Court to engage in future parsing of the imprecise language of section 1621(d) in light
of new and unprecedented immigration legislation and orders.
A broader order that includes all undocumented immigrants to apply for admission
to the bar would not limit this Court’s or the Utah State Bar’s ability to consider
immigration status as a factor. On the contrary, immigration status would remain highly
relevant to an individual applicant’s character and fitness but not act as a categorical
prohibition. In re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973) (finding a Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection violation in a state’s limitation of bar admission only to citizens); Nyquist
v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that distinguishing among aliens, rather than aliens
versus citizens, also raises Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection concerns). Under a
rule that allows admission of noncitizens to the bar irrespective of immigration status, Utah
would retain “wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to
practice law” to protect its “constitutionally permissible and substantial interest” in the
character of those admitted to the bar. In re Griffith, 413 U.S. at 722, 725 (citations
omitted).
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As set forth in the statute itself, the legislative purpose of section 1621 was to reduce
the incentives for illegal immigration by denying “aliens” not residing legally in the United
States benefits financed by “appropriated funds.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621, 1641(b).
Specifically, Congress stated that undocumented immigrants within the United States
should “not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own
capabilities” to achieve “self-sufficiency.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601.
By successfully graduating from Utah law schools and now seeking admission to
the Utah Bar, the Petitioners have demonstrated their own capabilities and self-sufficiency.
Their goals are not in contravention of 8 U.S.C. § 1601 but in support of its underlying
purposes of self-sufficiency. They do not seek public resources to meet their needs but
rather seek a Utah law license to further that self-sufficiency. There are no “appropriated”
funds required to grant the petitioners a Utah law license. As discussed above, the relevant
funds come from applicant fees and attorney dues. Additionally, many of the benefits listed
in sections 1601 and 1621, such as welfare and retirement payments, are either direct
income support payments or services intended to meet the daily needs of disadvantaged
individuals. The Petitioners and other similarly situated individuals—who have graduated
from law school and are eager to sit for the Utah bar—are not seeking “public resources.”
Indeed, they are excellent examples of individuals who are relying on their “own
capabilities” as opposed to “public resources.” Thus, the “Statements of National Policy
Concerning Welfare and Immigration” found in section 1601 further support the
proposition that a Utah law license is not a “public benefit” provided by “appropriated
funds of a State or local government.”
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully recommend that the Court allow
Petitioners and other individuals to apply for admission to the Utah bar irrespective of
their immigration status and—assuming all other admission criteria are met—be admitted
thereto. In the alternative, amicus recommend that the Court adopt a rule that allows
admission to the bar irrespective of immigration status.
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